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ABSTRACT
Auditor Type, Firm Ownership and Auditor Reporting Under A
Joint Audit Requirement:
Exploratory Evidence from India
by
ZOU Ting
Master of Philosophy

India is one of the largest developing countries in the world. Although many
issues and phenomena arising from its transitional economy are worthy of research
from an accounting perspective, the Indian accounting market is a field that remains
relatively unexplored in the extant literature. One of the institutional features of India
is that while it is mandatory for public sector companies and banks to have joint
auditors, their appointment is voluntary for other companies. In a thesis motivated by
this and other institutional features and the absence of related accounting and
auditing studies conducted in an Indian setting, I examine the relations of auditor
type and firm ownership with the types of auditor opinions issued under the joint
audit requirement.
Using a sample of 1,142 firm-year observations from the major Indian stock
exchanges from 2006-2008, I develop an auditor opinion model to examine the
relations between firm ownership, auditor type and auditor opinions under the
joint-audit requirement that applies in India. Companies’ self-selection bias for
auditors is also considered and corrected using the Heckman 2-step method. Based
on the empirical results, I report as follows. First, Big 4 auditors are more likely to
issue modified opinions than local Indian auditors. Second, the Indian government
assumes a supervisory role rather than a collusive role and the joint-audit
requirement is associated with a higher level of auditor reporting quality. Finally,
companies audited by joint auditors are more likely to receive modified opinions
than companies audited by a single auditor.
The findings provide evidence of the importance of understanding the pattern of
auditor opinion in India and the incentives of joint auditors, as well as the influence
this pattern has on auditor reporting quality in a transitional economy.
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Auditor Type, Firm Ownership and Auditor Reporting under a Joint Audit
Requirement: Exploratory Evidence from India

Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 India: a large emerging economy with many unexplored business issues
The importance of external auditing to modern corporate governance, the wider
economy and capital market development is well-established in the prior literature
(e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; Streim, 1994; Gul et al., 2007). However, the
importance of external auditing in India, one of the largest transitional economies in
the world, is a topic that is relatively under-researched. According to Perumpral et al.
(2009), in a trend that is driven by globalization, the attention of the world is today
centered on two emerging market economies: India and China. This is especially so
in the case of India, which is regarded by many as having a more favorable macro
environment and greater potential for future economic development than China due
to its liberal economy, British-framed legislation, and political democracy.
India’s annual economic growth since 2003-04 has been reported often at over 8
percent. More sectors have been opened to private activity; trade policy and the
exchange rate regime have been further liberalized; and capital markets have been
reformed, leading to an improved investment climate. Today, India has one of the
fastest growing economies in the world with a compounded average growth of 5.7
percent over the last two decades. The country’s total gross domestic product (GDP)
at US $3 trillion makes it the fourth largest in the world in purchase price parity
terms.
World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Report on the
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) 2004 states that International
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comparisons indicate that India has intrinsic advantages that should allow the country
to emerge as a major hub for manufacturing and labor-intensive service industries
--including accounting-related services. India’s intrinsic advantages include one of
the world’s largest local markets; a large and relatively low-cost labor force and a
large well-educated English-speaking population. To accelerate the development and
fulfill the potential of Indian, it requires building on the existing initiatives and
further strengthening of the corporate financial reporting regime and improving
comparability, transparency, and accountability. Hence, a better understanding of
Indian accounting and auditing is in urgent need.
1.2 India accounting: some research issues
The existing auditing research in India is focuses mainly on the audit fees (audit
service pricing), Big 4 versus non-Big 4 product differentiation in audit service
market, the convergence of Indian Accounting Standards (IAS) and the International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (Dugar et al., 1995; Simon et al., 1986;
Ahmed and Goyal, 2005 and Perumpral et al. 2009). Only one paper studies how
external auditing and managerial ownership relate to firm valuation in India (Ghosh
2007). Simon et al. (1986) report that determinants of audit fees in India are similar
to those of other countries; that is, audit fees are strongly related to client size, audit
risk and complexity variables. Also, the existence of a premium fee paid to Big 8
auditors (at the time of the study in 1986) is found. The author argues that the
premium fee result is consistent with the results of studies of several other countries,
which suggests the existence of product differentiation in the market for audit
services. Dugar et al. (1995) try to take a further step to examine Indian audit service
market taking the public sector companies versus the private sector companies
approach and find fees difference between these two sectors. Additionally, Ghosh,
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(2007) reports that the number of auditors employed and firm performance are
positively related in Indian companies, suggesting external monitoring enhances firm
performance.
1.3 Motivations of the study
India imposes a special legal requirement on its government-owned companies
and banks by obliging them to employ joint auditors for their annual statutory audit.
This joint audit regulatory requirement is a feature of the Indian market that is not
commonly observed in other countries, only France and Denmark have similar rules.
My study is motivated by the following two factors. First, prior accounting and
auditing studies carried out in India mainly focus on reviewing the general auditing
service market and the audit fees issue (Simon et al., 1986; Dugar et al., 1995).
However, we know little about other important accounting and auditing research
issues such as the relation between the Indian government and auditors and factors
influencing the types of opinions Indian auditors issue. These two questions are both
investigated in this study.
Second, although the joint audit requirement provides a unique institutional
setting for analysis, to the best of my knowledge, no research has been carried out in
this field in India to date. Although Francis et al. (2009) examine auditor choice for
listed companies in France where two (joint) auditors are required by law, the
institutional environment and accounting market in India are quite different from
those in France. It is not clear whether the results of Francis et al. (2009) can be
generalized to a different institutional setting. This thesis takes the initiative by
examining the relation between the joint audit requirement and auditor reporting
quality in India.
1.4 Results of the study
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Based on a sample of 1,142 firm-year observations of Indian listed companies
from 2006 to 2008, I develop an auditor opinion model to examine the relations
between firm ownership, auditor type, and auditor opinions under the joint audit
requirement that applies in the institutional setting of India. Companies’
self-selection bias for auditors is also considered and corrected using the Heckman
2-step method. The empirical results support my conjectures that Big 4 auditors
provide higher quality services than their local rivals. Further, Indian
government-owned companies are more likely to receive qualified opinions than
non-government-owned companies. Finally, companies audited by the joint auditors
are indicated to have higher reporting quality than companies audited by a single
auditor.
1.5 Contributions of the study
This paper contributes to the existing auditing literature in several ways. First,
my study contributes to the Indian accounting and auditing literature by providing
empirical evidence on the determinants of auditor opinion issuance in India. Second,
this study fills the research gap on the influence of the joint audit requirement on
auditor reporting behavior in India. Finally, the Indian government’s supervisory
effect on local Indian auditors’ issuance of opinions to government-owned
companies may provide a useful reference for other transitional economies, as
auditing risks and failures in transitional economies are frequently documented as
being a result of auditor collusion in which local auditors issue more favorable
opinions to government-owned companies.
1.6 Structure of the thesis
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the
institutional background. Chapter 3 presents the literature review and develops the
4

hypotheses. Chapter 4 discusses the research design and Chapter 5 reports the
empirical results. I present my conclusions in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2 Institutional background
To have a better understanding of the Indian accounting and auditing
environment and to lay the ground for development of the three hypotheses
examined in this study, this section discusses the institutional background to the
Indian audit market by examining Indian legislation covering the accounting and
auditing profession, giving an overview of the auditing and securities markets, and
addressing some special issues affecting Indian government-owned companies,
financial institutions, and joint auditors.
2.1 The legal framework governing the Indian accounting and auditing profession
The Companies Act (1956) sets out the basic financial reporting requirements
that apply to all companies incorporated in India. The Companies Act requires that
financial statements be prepared, presented, published, and disclosed and that all
companies be audited by a member-in-practice certified by the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India (ICAI). Schedule VI to the Act prescribes the form, content and
minimum disclosure requirements of financial statements. The accounting period
(financial year) adopted in India is from April 1st of the given year to March 31st of
the next year.
The Central Government enforces the Companies Act (“the Act”) through the
Department of Company Affairs (DCA), the Company Law Board, the regional
directors, and the Registrars of Companies (ROC). Every regional director’s office
has a special unit for inspection of companies’ accounts. While regional directors
have in some cases taken action against erring auditors under the Act, they generally
refer such cases to the ICAI. The ROC is expected to scrutinize the records of
registered companies for compliance with provisions of the Act. This function is
hampered by a severe lack of capacity in terms of trained manpower and thus
6

restricts the ROC’s oversight of listed companies. The Company Law Board is an
independent quasi-judicial body that receives petitions of complaint from the general
public concerning the functioning and management of companies. The Company
Law Board also receives applications for waivers from companies with regard to
application of some of the provisions of the Act. Powers to implement penalties,
notices, and sanctions are delegated among the DCA, the regional directors, and the
ROC.
The Chartered Accountants Act (1949) governs the accountancy profession in
India. The history of the Indian accounting profession began with enactment of the
Indian Companies Act in 1857, a piece of legislation that first introduced the concept
of preparing a company balance sheet on a voluntary basis. The Indian Companies
Act of 1866 introduced legal requirements regarding the maintenance of accounts
and auditors’ qualifications. A system of auditor certification by the local
government was initiated after a new Companies Act was passed in 1913. Following
India’s independence in 1947, an expert committee was formed to examine a scheme
for an autonomous association of accountants in India, which led to the enactment of
the Chartered Accountants Act (1949) and the establishment of the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India in the same year. The ICAI regulates the
accountancy profession and, in line with India’s imperial history, was initially
modeled on the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW).
The ICAI acts both as an examining body that grants chartered accountancy
qualifications and licenses and as a disciplinary authority for its members. The ICAI
has been a founding member of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)
since its inception in 1977. With a reputation for excellence, the ICAI has been the
institution of choice for business graduates and aspiring business advisers and now
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has a highly skilled membership of over 110,000, making it one of the largest
professional accountancy bodies in the world.
2.2 Auditing market overview
Small audit firms dominate the Indian auditing marketplace, even though the
Indian affiliates of large international firm networks (such as the Big 4 audit firms of
Deloitte, Ernst & Young, Price Waterhouse, and KPMG) audit approximately 47
percent of the top 100 listed companies.1 The ICAI reports that about 53,245 audit
firms operate in India, including members/affiliates of most of the international
networks of accounting firms. In addition, about 1,000 firms audit at least one
economically significant enterprise and about 15 of the largest firms audit more than
70 percent of the top 100 listed companies. Government-owned companies, unlisted
companies, public sector banks, and insurance companies are generally audited by
small- and medium-size local firms. According to Report on the observance of
standards and codes (ROSC 2004), this is due to the unremunerative fee scales
prescribed for these engagements. In most cases, the regulator or the Office of the
Comptroller and Auditor General of India mandates joint auditors for state-owned
enterprises, public sector banks, and insurance companies.
Members of the ICAI are required to follow a detailed code of ethics prescribed
under the Chartered Accountants Act. The ICAI Council is entrusted with
disciplinary powers that are exercised through its Disciplinary Committee. In matters
concerning the public interest, penalty awards require confirmation by a High Court.
Professional indemnity insurance is not compulsory and the ICAI does not
specifically require or recommend that auditors take out such insurance.

1 Local affiliates of large international networks audit 11 out of the top 50 Indian companies and jointly audit 6
other companies in the top 50 with another medium-size firm (for 34 percent of the top 50). They also audit 25
out of the 51st-100th ranked companies and jointly audit 5 other companies in that bracket with another
medium-size firm (for 60 percent of companies in that bracket).
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The Accounting Standards Board (ASB) and the Auditing and Assurance
Standards Board (AASB) are responsible for assisting the ICAI in setting standards.
Due process is followed in promulgating both accounting standards and auditing and
assurance standards (AAS). Based on draft regulations prepared by the ASB and the
AASB, the ICAI Council approves and issues new standards under its authority and
prescribes deadlines for their adoption.
2.3 Securities market overview
There are two main pieces of legislation governing the Indian securities market.
The Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act of 1956 provides for regulation of
transactions in securities and aims to prevent undesirable transactions in securities.
The other main piece of legislation, the Securities and Exchange Board of India
(SEBI) Act of 1992, is aimed at protecting investors and developing and regulating
the securities market. Listed companies in India are required to comply with SEBI
requirements as outlined in the SEBI Act and the Securities Contracts (Regulation)
Act. To protect investor interests, SEBI-issued listing requirements specify
disclosures applicable to listed companies in addition to other applicable auditing and
accounting requirements. The SEBI uses listing agreements to require compliance
with ICAI-issued accounting standards.
India has three stock exchanges: the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), the
National Stock Exchange of India (NSE), and the Calcutta Stock Exchange (CSE).
According to its official Website, the BSE is the world's number one exchange in
terms of the number of listed companies and the world's fifth ranking exchange
according to the number of transactions handled by its electronic trading system.2
The Website also reports that companies listed on the BSE in July 2009 had a total
2

Official BSE Website: http://www.bseindia.com/about/introbse.asp
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market capitalization of USD 1.06 trillion. The BSE has a presence in over 400 cities
and towns nationwide and has around 4,937 listed companies, with over 7,745 scripts
being traded on 31st July 2009.
The Bombay and National Stock Exchanges rely on external auditors to monitor
compliance with the accounting and disclosure requirements. Listed companies are
required to submit their financial statements to the Stock Exchange. The Stock
Exchanges closely monitor compliance with requirements of their Listing Agreement
and promptly act on publishing of any information that could mislead investors. The
Stock Exchanges in India are generally satisfied if a publicly traded company issues
audited financial statements on a timely basis, and such statements are accompanied
by an unqualified audit opinion. The Corporate Relations Department of the Stock
Exchange pursues any qualification by the auditors with the company and requires
corrections by the following year-end. The Stock Exchanges lack sufficient number
of qualified professionals and financial resources to systematically carry out
monitoring of compliance with accounting and financial reporting requirements.
In addition, the BSE SENSEX and the BSE 100 index are popular and
well-known indices both domestically and globally. The BSE SENSEX, India’s first
and most popular stock market benchmark index, comprises 30 stocks representing
12 major sectors and is tracked worldwide.
2.4 Special issues in India
2.4.1 Government-owned companies
Chapter 617 of the Companies Act (1956) defines a government company as
one in which 51 percent of the paid-up share capital is held by a state government,
the central government, or some combination of the state and central governments.
Subsidiaries of such entities are also deemed to be government companies.
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Under Chapter 619 of the Companies Act (1956), auditors of corporatized
state-owned enterprises are appointed and re-appointed by the Comptroller and
Auditor General of India (CAG). The CAG maintains and updates a panel of private
sector firms qualified to undertake annual audits of state-owned enterprises.3 The
allocation of audit work among these audit firms is based on a points system that
gives credit based on information disclosed by the audit firms themselves, including
the number of partners in the firm, the number of employees and trainees, the
experience of the firm, and the number of years for which the partners have been
associated with the firm. These audit firms have to provide the required information
outlined above in standard questionnaires that are reviewed by the Office of the
Comptroller and Auditor General of India. The boards of directors of state-owned
enterprises determine the professional fees paid to their auditors on the basis of
guidelines issued by the CAG and such fees are subsequently approved by
shareholders of the company. The CAG conducts a supplementary test audit of all
such companies on a regular basis. Depending upon the audit arrangements, as
specified by these rules, the audit may be performed by either a private sector auditor
or a state-appointed auditor, which may include the Office of the Comptroller and
Auditor General of India or its appointee.
2.4.2 Financial institutions
The Banking Regulation Act (1949) empowers the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)
to regulate financial reporting among financial sector participants including banks
and financial institutions. 4 The Third Schedule to the Banking Regulation Act
prescribes formats for general purpose financial statements (balance sheet and profit
3

Corporatized state-owned enterprises include about 1,400 public commercial and non-commercial enterprises
controlled by unions and state governments.
4
There are approximately 60 Indian banks including 27 state-owned banks (19 nationalized banks and the State
Bank of India and its 7 subsidiaries) and over 30 private banks.
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and loss account) and sets out other disclosure requirements. Banking companies are
also required to comply with Companies Act requirements that are consistent with
the Banking Regulation Act. The RBI has issued circulars requiring compliance with
the ICAI-issued accounting standards. All banks must publish audited financial
statements within three months of the financial year-end. Since 2002-03, all banks
have been required to prepare consolidated financial statements; during 2001-02,
consolidation was mandatory for listed banks only. Private sector firms and foreign
banks are required to seek prior approval from the RBI before appointing their
auditors. The public sector banks appoint their statutory auditors (principal auditors
and branch auditors) on the basis of recommendations made by the RBI (other than
in the case of the State Bank of India, for which the principal auditors are appointed
directly by the RBI pursuant to the State Bank of India Act); these recommendations
are made from a list of RBI-empanelled auditors. Statutory principal auditors rely on
branch auditors’ reports in issuing audit opinions on the bank’s annual financial
statements. The list of RBI-empanelled auditors is compiled from self-disclosure
forms completed annually by interested auditors. The appointment, re-appointment,
or removal of a bank statutory auditor requires RBI approval. All state-owned banks
must have a minimum of four (joint) statutory auditors and bank auditors must be
replaced at least once every four years. No audit firm is allowed to audit more than
four private sector banks and one state-owned bank during any single year.
2.4.3 The joint audit requirement
Joint audits are required in countries such as India, France, and Denmark
(Francis et al., 2009; Thinggaard and Kiertzner, 2008). A joint audit is an audit
carried out on a legal entity (the auditee) by two or more auditors who produce a
single audit report and thereby share responsibility for the audit. The auditors are
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typically audit firms rather than individuals. In a typical joint audit, audit planning is
performed jointly and fieldwork is allocated to each of the auditors. This work
allocation may be rotated after a set number of years to mitigate the risk of
over-familiarity. The work performed by each auditor is reviewed by the other, in
most cases by exchanging audit summary reports. The critical issues at group level,
including group consolidation, are reviewed jointly and there is joint reporting to the
legal entity’s management, its audit committee, a government entity, or the general
public.
According to SA 299 (Standards on Auditing, formerly known as Auditing and
Accounting Standards 12 (AAS 12)), “All the joint auditors are jointly and severally
responsible in respect of the audit work which is not divided amongst them. On the
other hand, all the joint auditors are jointly and severally responsible for examining
that the financial statements of the entity comply with the disclosure requirements of
the relevant statute and for ensuring that the audit report complies with the
requirements of the relevant statute and in respect of matters which are brought to the
notice of the joint auditors by any one of them and on which there is an agreement
among the joint auditors. Each joint auditor is entitled to assume that the other joint
auditors have carried out their part of the audit work in accordance with the generally
accepted audit procedures. Normally, the joint auditors are able to arrive at an agreed
report. However, where the joint auditors are in disagreement with regard to any
matters to be covered by the report, each one of them should express their own
opinion through a separate report.” In addition, a joint audit is different from a dual
audit in that the latter is performed by two independent auditors who issue their own
separate reports before another auditor uses these reports to compile the final report
on the entity as a whole.
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Chapter 3 Literature review and hypothesis development
Based on previous related research and features of the Indian institutional
setting as summarized earlier, I develop three hypotheses to examine the
determinants of auditor reporting quality in India, which is measured by the
probability of receiving a modified auditor opinion (MAO). The first hypothesis
examines the relation between reporting quality and the choice of two kinds of
auditors: Big 4 and local Indian auditors. The second hypothesis examines how firm
ownership affects auditor’s reporting behavior, and the third hypothesis examines the
influence of the joint audit requirement on audit quality in India.
3.1 Auditor types
Firms of chartered accountants in India may be broadly classified into three
groups: (1) local firms serving clients in one city or region only – these are small
firms; (2) regional firms that have offices in major locations where their clients
operate or that have formed affiliations with prominent local accounting firms to
serve client offices in remote geographical areas – these firms are generally
somewhat larger; and (3) very large national firms that have offices in most major
industrial and commercial centers – represented by the Big 4 accounting firms
(Simon et al., 1986; Marmousez, 2008). The dichotomy between Big 4 auditors
(international auditors) and non-Big 4 auditors (local Indian auditors) is also used in
this study, to examine whether there is a significant difference in auditor reporting
quality in terms of the frequency of qualified opinions issued by these two groups of
auditors.
Following DeAngelo (1981), who argues that large audit firms are more likely
to provide a higher quality audit than non-Big 4 audit firms, prior research suggests
that Big 4 auditors provide higher quality audits to protect the firm's brand name
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reputation and to avoid costly litigation (Craswell et al., 1995). Chan and Wu (2011)
find that audit firms with more quasi-rent at stake provide higher quality audits in
China’s context. The quasi-rents at stake are based mainly on audits of listed
companies.
Based on the Indian audit market and related literature, for audits on Indian
listed companies, I hypothesize as follows:

H1: Indian companies are more likely to receive qualified opinions from Big 4
auditors than from local Indian auditors.

3.2 Firm ownerships
With its deregulated domestic market and British-framed legal system, India is
widely regarded as a more liberal and market-oriented country than China, another
globally important transitional economy, both economically and politically (Banerjee,
2002; Ahmed and Goyal, 2005; Ren, 2009). Recent research supports the view that
common law countries such as India have stronger investor protection laws and more
developed financial markets than civil law countries such as China (La Porta et al.,
1997, 1998; Francis, et al., 2001). Moreover, the CAG conducts a supplementary test
audit of all government-owned companies on a regular basis that functions as a
review supporting better auditor independence in Indian government-owned
companies.
While evidence of auditor collusion has been found and reported in the Chinese
setting (Chan et al., 2006), the Chinese institutional setting is uniquely responsible
for such collusion. The history of government-sponsored CPA firms and local
government ownership of the great majority of listed companies do not apply to India.
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Hence, I predict that the Indian government has more of a supervisory rather than a
collusive influence on auditor reporting behavior in government-owned companies.
Therefore, my second hypothesis is as follows:

H2: Government-owned companies are more likely to receive qualified opinions
than non-government-owned companies in India.

3.3 The joint audit requirement
In India, it is mandatory for public sector companies and banks to have joint
auditors, whereas other listed companies may choose between appointing joint
auditors or retaining a single auditor. The joint audit requirement applicable to public
sector firms provides an ideal setting for studying the role it plays in auditor
reporting quality. This study takes the initiative by exploring the joint audit
regulatory feature of India, an area in which little prior research has been conducted.
To the best of my knowledge, Indian listed companies that choose to appoint
joint auditors on a voluntary basis do so for the following reasons. First, the
appointment of joint auditors is usually regarded as a means of providing the public
with a higher level of assurance of auditor reporting quality according to social
business reporting practices in India. Hence, some companies may choose to retain
joint auditors to gain an advantage in the public sphere and improve their public
image. Second, companies that are too big to be audited by one audit firm —
typically public utilities and banks — often hire two or three firms that combine their
resources to audit the company.
Research on the joint audit requirement has been carried out in France, a
country where all its listed companies are required to employ two audit firms to
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conduct a joint audit. (The term “joint auditors” is synonymous with “joint
auditorship,” “joint audit” or “joint auditing” in the literature.) Francis et al. (2009)
find that French firms are valued more highly than neighboring firms in Belgium,
which has a kindred legal and regulatory system. This finding suggests that investors
may perceive two auditors to be better than one. However, comparing the audit
quality between two countries involves many confounding factors such as the
differences in auditing standards and audit markets. In my case, I investigate the
impact of joint audit requirement on audit quality within a single country setting.
Finally, Piot and Janin (2005) also argue that the joint audit requirement is perceived
to have two advantages: on one hand, it offers a reciprocal check of each auditor’s
diligence, and on the other hand, it reinforces each auditor’s independence.
Consequently, joint audits should improve audit quality.
Consequently, the following hypothesis is proposed regarding the relationship
between joint auditors and auditor reporting quality as proxied by the probability of
receiving a MAO.

H3: Companies audited by joint auditors are more likely to receive qualified
opinions than companies audited by a single auditor.
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Chapter 4 Research design
4.1 Data collection and sample statistics
The data employed for this study are cross-sectional data for the 2006-2008
period extracted from the Prowess database (Release 3.1) generated and maintained
by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), a leading private think tank
in India. The data set includes 1,142 firm-year observations from the 2006-2008
period for listed companies that were either members of the Bombay Stock Exchange
A group (referred to as BSE-A 200 companies in this paper; see Appendix 1 for BSE
company group classifications) or were BSE-B group companies audited by the Big
4 auditors (Deloitte, ERNST & YOUNG, KPMG and PRICE WATERHOUSE;
names of the Indian Big 4 affiliates are provided in Appendix 2). The top 100 BSE
companies represent nearly 86 percent of BSE market capitalization and State-owned
enterprises account for approximately 32 percent of BSE market capitalization. (The
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 2004). I combine the samples of
the companies of BSE-B group that audited by Big 4 auditors with the data set of
BSE-A group 200 companies for the reason that these companies represent the
first-tier or higher quality listed firms in terms of financial situation and asset quality
in India. The descriptive statistics based on this 1,142-observation sample and the
definitions of each variable used in this study are reported in Panel A and Panel B of
Table 1, respectively.
The 1,142 firm-year observations are selected via a three-step process. First, I
extract 2006-2008 financial data on all BSE-A 200 companies from the Prowess
database, obtaining 600 observations in total (200 firm-year observations annually
over a three-year observation period). Second, I manually screen for companies in
the BSE-B group that are audited by Big 4 auditors, yielding 164 firm-year
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observations in 2006, 224 firm-year observations in 2007, and 162 firm-year
observations in 2008. This step yields an additional 550 (164 + 224 + 162) firm-year
observations to add to the 600 identified in step 1, giving a sample size of 1,150
firm-year observations. Third, I delete eight cases with incomplete data manually and
obtain the final sample of 1,142 firm-year observations.
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics grouped by the auditor opinion type
(unqualified opinion or qualified opinion) that the company received during the
sample period. In Panel B of Table 2, the paired T-test reveals a statistically
significant difference between the means of Ownership, Own*Type, MS, MS*Big4,
and Auditors_fees at the 1% significance level. The differences in the means of
Ownership, MS, and Auditors_fees (between firms grouped by unqualified opinion
and qualified opinion) are worth noting and suggest that these variables should be
included and examined further in Model (2) to identify the determinants of auditor
opinion issuance.
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Table 1: Variable definitions
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Financial variables:
Assets
Inventories
Receivables
Current_ratio
D/E_ratio
ROE
Other variables:
Opinion
Ownership
Type
Own*Type
MS
MS*Big4
Auditors_Fees
Age

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

3.137
0.119
0.184
1.995
0.894
2.209

0.875
0.127
0.142
6.904
3.407
6.469

0.556
0.000
0.000
0.000
-79.460
-169.627

5.753
0.834
0.731
221.670
43.210
95.643

0.261
0.103
0.374
0.098
0.853
0.968
1.140
11.448

0.439
0.305
0.484
0.298
0.354
0.175
3.635
6.252

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
62.280
18.000

Panel B: Variable definitions
Variable
Definition
Financial variables:
Assets
Common log of total assets at the end of the fiscal year (Mar 31st).
Inventory
The ratio of inventory to total assets at the end of the fiscal year.
Receivables
The ratio of receivables to total assets at the end of the fiscal year.
Current_Ratio The ratio of current assets to current liabilities at the end of the fiscal
year.
D/E_ ratio
The ratio of long-term debt to shareholders’ equity at the end of the
fiscal year.
ROE
The ratio of net income to shareholders’ equity at the end of the fiscal
year.
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Panel B: Variable definitions
Other variables:
The Opinion variable is equal to 1 if the auditor opinion is qualified
and 0 if the auditor opinion is clean.
Ownership
The Opinion variable is equal to 1 if the company is state / central
government-owned and 0 if it is non-government owned.
Type
The Type variable is equal to 1 if the company’s auditors are all local
Indian auditors and 0 if it is audited by at least one international auditor.
Own*Type
The Own*Type variable is equal to 1 if the company is owned by the
government and its auditors are all local auditors and 0 if otherwise.
MS
The MS variable is equal to 1 if the company is audited by a single
auditor and 0 if it is audited by more than one auditor.
MS*Big4
The MS*Big4 variable is equal to 0 if the company is audited by joint
auditors including at least one of Big 4 auditors and 1 if otherwise.
Auditors_Fees The total amount of auditor(s) fees that the company paid to its
auditor(s) in the observed year.
Age
The number of years for which the company has been listed in the
observed year.
Imills
The inverse Mills ratio in the Heckman two-step logit regression.
Opinion
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Table 2: The independent sample test, grouped by auditor opinions (N = 1,142)
Panel A: Opinion group statistics
Opinion
Ownership
0
1
Type
0
1
Own*Type
0
1
MS
0
1
MS*Big4
0
1
Assets
0
1
Inventories
0
1
Receivables
0
1
Current ratio
0
1
0
Debt equity ratio
1
ROE
0
1
Auditors_Fees
0
1
Age
0
1

N
844
298
844
298
844
298
834
296
837
297
844
298
844
298
844
298
844
298
844
298
844
298
838
298
838
298

Panel B: Paired t-test between opinion types
t
Ownership
-4.199
Type
-0.498
Own*Type
-4.019
MS
4.014
MS*Big4
-0.165
Assets
-2.810
Inventories
1.203
Receivables
0.210
Current ratio
-0.197
Debt equity ratio
1.113
ROE
1.046
Auditors_Fees
-5.142
Age
1.701
Notes:

** Represents significance at the 1% level.
All variables are as defined in Table 1.
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%
73.91
26.09
73.91
26.09
73.91
26.09
73.81
26.19
73.81
26.19
73.91
26.09
73.91
26.09
73.91
26.09
73.91
26.09
73.91
26.09
73.91
26.09
73.77
26.23
73.77
26.23
Sig.
0.000**
0.619
0.000**
0.000**
0.869
0.005**
0.229
0.834
0.844
0.266
0.296
0.000**
0.089

Mean
Std.Deviation
0.077
0.267
0.178
0.383
0.370
0.483
0.386
0.488
0.073
0.261
0.168
0.374
0.881
0.324
0.774
0.419
0.968
0.177
0.970
0.172
3.089
0.818
3.271
1.008
0.121
0.129
0.111
0.121
0.185
0.136
0.182
0.157
1.971
7.708
2.062
3.803
0.960
2.709
0.705
4.868
2.328
4.206
1.872
10.506
0.622
1.231
2.596
6.584
11.636
6.347
10.919
5.955
Mean Difference
-0.101
-0.016
-0.094
0.108
-0.002
-0.182
0.010
0.002
-0.092
0.256
0.456
-1.973
0.717

As shown in Table 3, I then run the paired correlations test using the
1,142-observation data set and obtain the Pearson’s correlation coefficients. The
coefficient on Ownership is positive and significant, providing further support for my
argument in Hypothesis 2 that the likelihood of receiving a qualified auditor opinion
is

greater

for

Indian

government-owned

companies

than

it

is

for

non-government-owned companies. In addition, the coefficient on MS is negative
and significant, providing further support for the argument of Hypothesis 3 that joint
auditors are associated with higher audit reporting quality.
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Table 3: Pearson Correlation Matrix (N =1142)
Opinion

Ownership

Type

Own*Type

MS

MS*Big4

Opinion
Ownership

1
0.1455**

1

Type
Own*Type
MS
MS*Big4

0.0147
0.1393**
-0.1337**
0.0049

0.3976**
0.9617**
-0.3242**
0.0452

1
0.4267**
-0.3524**
0.1402**

1
-0.3308**
0.0599*

1
0.4371**

1

Assets
Inventories
Receivables

0.0915**
-0.0356
-0.0066

0.3484**
-0.0465
-0.137**

0.5998**
-0.1054**
-0.2169**

0.3593**
-0.0435
-0.1288**

-0.421**
0.092**
0.1742**

-0.054
-0.0222
-0.0158

Current_ratio
D/E_ratio
ROE
F_dummy

0.0058
-0.033
-0.031
0.032
Assets

-0.0053
0.0012
0.0264
0.0916**
Inventories

-0.0022
0.0499
-0.009
0.1381**
Receivables

-0.0034
0.0023
0.0295
0.1006**
Current_ratio

-0.0025
-0.0086
0.0207
-0.0686*
D/E_ratio

0.0106
-0.0097
0.006
0.0702*
ROE

Assets
Inventories
Receivables
Current_ratio
D/E_ratio
ROE
F_dummy

1
-0.1663**
-0.3154**
0.0269
0.1127**
-0.0324
0.2247**

1
0.1905**
-0.0566
0.0336
0.1495**
-0.1627

1
-0.0558
-0.0531
0.1424**
-0.273**

1
-0.0161
-0.0256
0.006**

1
0.8034**
0.0415

1
-0.1196**

Notes:

** Represents significance at the 1% level.
* Represents significance at the 5% level.
All variables are as defined in Table 1.
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4.2 Regression analysis
My sample data show that Indian government-owned companies are inclined to
choose Indian local auditors, about 94%, and non-government-owned companies are
inclined to choose international auditors such as Big 4, about 69%. The reasons that
Indian government-owned companies and non-government-owned companies have
different auditor selection inclinations can be partially explained as follows. First, as
noted in Chapter 2, the CAG encourages Indian government-owned companies to
employ local audit firms. Second, as Indian government-owned companies generally
have a good public reputation and a comparatively good financial status, they do not
need the Big 4 audits to enhance public trust, especially given the joint audit
requirement.

Third,

in

comparison

with

public

sector

companies,

non-government-owned companies cannot rely to any great extent on the Indian
government’s reputation to back them up; therefore, non-government-owned
companies are inclined to choose international Big 4 auditors to enhance their
financial credibility in the capital market.
Considering the reasons outlined above for the different auditor selection
inclinations of public and private sector companies, I use the Heckman two-step
method to control for self-selection effects. Heckman (1979) derived this two-step
method to correct for selectivity bias in linear regression models with normal errors.
Dubin and Rivers (1989) applied the same basic conceptual framework to logit and
probit models and developed a two-stage binary probit method to control for
self-selection bias in discrete-choice models. Following prior studies, I first estimate
a probit auditor selection model and use the results to generate the inverse Mills
ratios, which are denoted as Imills in this study. Next, I include the inverse Mills
ratios in audit opinion issuance models for the clients of Big 4 and local Indian
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auditors to correct for selectivity bias. The estimated coefficients of the audit opinion
issuance models will be biased if the inverse Mills ratios are omitted from the
regression. The self-selection model is given as follows.
Step one: Auditor choice
Probit(Type) = β0 + β1Ownership + β2MS
+

+ Auditors_fees + Age + ε

(1)

Step two: Auditor opinion issuance
Logit(Opinion) = β0 + β1Ownership + β2Type +β3Own*Type + β4MS
+ β5MS*Big4 + β6F_dummy + β7Imills
+

+

+

+ε

(2)

The definitions of the variables given above are presented in Panel B of Table 1
and the descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in Tables 1-4. Type,
Own*Type, and MS*Big4 are excluded from Model (1) to avoid collinearity.
Specifically, Type and Own*Type (the interactive term of auditor type combined
with firm ownership) are employed mainly to capture the influence of auditor type on
auditor reporting. Ownership and Own*Type are used to examine the influence of
the Indian government on auditor reporting behavior. The coefficient of Type is
predicted to be negative and the coefficient of Ownership is expected to be positive,
while the direction of Own*Type needs to be empirically examined. Further, MS and
MS*Big4 are included to test whether the joint audit requirement improves auditor
reporting quality. MS is predicted to have a negative coefficient and as in the case of
Own*Type, the direction of MS*Big4 needs to be empirically examined.
Auditor reporting quality is measured by the frequency of modified audit
opinion (MAO) rendered by an auditor. The higher the frequency, the higher the
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audit quality. This is because lower quality auditors tend to give clean opinion to
retain audit clients, but auditors will not render a qualified opinion unnecessarily.
This MAO measurement has been used by Reynolds and Francis (2001), Chan et al.
(2006) and Wang et al. (2008). An opinion is considered to be modified in this study
if it is unqualified but with emphasis of matter, a qualified opinion, a disclaimer
opinion (the sample includes only one such case) or an adverse opinion (the sample
does not include any such case). Opinions that are clean are considered to be
unqualified in this study. According to Auditing and Assurance Standard (AAS) 28 -The Auditor's Report on Financial Statements, “the opinion with emphasis of matter
is issued, in certain circumstances, an auditor's report may be modified by adding an
emphasis of matter paragraph to highlight a matter affecting the financial statements
which is included in a note to the financial statements that more extensively
discusses the matter. The addition of such an emphasis of matter paragraph does not
affect the auditor's opinion. The paragraph would preferably be included preceding
the opinion paragraph and would ordinarily refer to the fact that the auditor's opinion
is not qualified in this respect.” The auditor should modify the auditor's report by
adding a paragraph to highlight a material matter regarding a going concern problem
where the going concern question is not resolved and adequate disclosures have not
been made in the financial statements, or if there is a significant uncertainty (other
than going concern problem), the resolution of which is dependent upon future
events and which may affect the financial statements. Also according to AAS 28, a
qualified opinion should be expressed when the auditor concludes that an unqualified
opinion cannot be expressed but that the effect of any disagreement with
management is not so material and pervasive as to require an adverse opinion, or
limitation on scope is not so material and pervasive as to require a disclaimer of
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opinion. A disclaimer of opinion should be expressed when the possible effect of a
limitation on scope is so material and pervasive that the auditor has not been able to
obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence and is, accordingly, unable to express an
opinion on the financial statements. An adverse opinion should be expressed when
the effect of a disagreement is so material and pervasive to the financial statements
that the auditor concludes that a qualification of the report is not adequate to disclose
the misleading or incomplete nature of the financial statements.
Chapter 617 of the Companies Act (1956) defines a government company as
one in which 51% of the paid-up share capital is held by a state government, the
central government, or some combination of the state and the central governments.
The term “government-owned companies in India” used in this study is consistent
with the definition given above. Subsidiaries of such entities are also deemed to be
government-owned companies.
In addition, if a company has joint auditors and at least one of these joint
auditors is linked to a Big 4 accounting firm, then this company observation is
categorized as Type = 0 (audited by Big 4). I also include three sets of dummy
variables to distinguish between financial companies and non-financial companies,
between observations for each of the three years in the 2006-2008 period, and
between companies according to industry type (manufacturing, mining, electricity,
non-financial services, and construction).
4.2.1 Financial variables
I include as control variables in the model a number of client characteristic
variables, which are examined in prior studies (e.g., DeFond et al., 2000) that may
affect the likelihood of receiving a modified opinion.
I use Assets to proxy for client size by taking the logarithm of the client’s
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year-end total assets. As companies with greater assets are regarded as financially
more healthy and reliable (Schwartz and Menon, 1985), I expect the Assets variable
negatively correlated with the frequency of receiving a modified opinion. The ROE
variable is also included in the audit opinion model and is expected to be negatively
linked to the issuance of modified opinions.
To control for the financial liquidity of companies, I use the current ratio
(Current_ratio) and the debt to equity ratio (D/E_ratio) and expect the coefficient of
Current_ratio to be negative and that of D/E_ratio to be positive. The ratios of
inventory and accounts receivable to total client assets — Inventory and Receivables
— are included to control for audit risk and complexity. These two variables are
expected to be positively associated with the issuance of modified opinions.
4.2.2 Year dummy variables
To examine whether there is any special year effect in the 1,142 cross-sectional
observations from 2006-2008, I employ two year dummy variables: Year_dummy_1
and Year_dummy_2. The empirical results suggest that there is no special year effect
related to the frequency of a modified opinion being issued. These two year dummy
variables are included in the model but are not reported in Table 6 for brievity.
4.2.3 Industry dummy variables
The industry coding is based on the classification scheme adopted in the
Prowess

database.

Companies

are

classified

as

non–financial

(including

manufacturing, mining, electricity, non-financial services, and construction
companies) and financial services companies. Five dummy variables —
Indu_dummy_1,

Indu_dummy_2,

Indu_dummy_3,

Indu_dummy_4,

and

Indu_dummy_5 — are used in regression Model (2) to capture the influence of each
of these six different industries (the five industries classified as non-financial and the
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financial services industry).
The sample firms include 639 manufacturing companies, 23 mining companies,
35 electricity companies, 240 non-financial service companies, 57 construction
companies, and 148 financial companies. The five industry dummy variables are
included in the model but are not reported in Table 6 for brievity.

30

Chapter 5 Empirical Results
Table 4 reports descriptive information on client firm characteristics divided by
class of firm ownership and auditor type in Panel A and summarizes the statistical
relationship between auditor opinion and auditor type in Panel B. The analysis of
mean F-values indicates that Auditors-Fees and Receivables differ significantly in
the two firm ownership categories: Indian government-owned companies and
non-government-owned companies. Panel B of Table 4 shows that among Indian
government-owned companies, the percentage of companies that receive a modified
auditor opinion is 64.5% for those audited by local Indian auditors and 63.6% for
those audited by Big 4 auditors. However, among non-government-owned companies,
the percentage of companies that receive a modified auditor opinion is 20.6% for
those audited by local Indian auditors and 25.4% for those audited by Big 4 auditors.
The differences between these two sets of results indicate that Indian
government-owned companies are more likely to receive a qualified opinion than
non-government-owned companies as proposed by Hypothesis 2.
Further, in Panel C of Table 4, the percentage of companies receiving modified
auditor opinions from joint auditors is reported as 40.4%, while the percentage of
companies receiving a modified opinion from a single auditor is only 23.8%. These
results support the view that companies audited by joint auditors are significantly
more likely to receive a modified auditor opinion, as predicted by Hypothesis 3.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics on client firm characteristics, auditor opinions divided by
client ownership, auditor type, and number of auditors (N = 1142)
Government-owned
Non-government-owned
Companies
Companies
Analysis
of mean
Local
Big 4
Local
Big 4
F-value
auditors
auditors
auditors
auditors
(Mean)
(Mean)
(Mean)
(Mean)
Panel A: Client firm characteristics
Assets
4.098
3.022
3.716
2.728
0.099
Inventories
0.100
0.128
0.102
0.129
2.069
Receivables
0.128
0.109
0.150
0.209
4.560 *
Current_ratio
1.927
1.250
1.992
2.014
0.340
D/E_ratio
0.915
0.747
1.184
0.763
0.431
ROE
2.781
1.619
1.905
2.260
0.380
Auditors_Fees
2.976
0.190
2.110
0.425
6.723 **
Age
9.883
5.286
11.658
11.662
2.218
N
111
7
316
708
Government-owned
Non-government-owned
Companies
Companies
Local Auditors
Big 4 Auditors
Local Auditors
Big 4 Auditors
Number
%
Number
%
Number % Number
%
Panel B: Auditor opinions and auditor type
Unqualified
61
35.5 4
36.4
opinion
Modified
50
64.5 3
63.6
opinion
N
111
100
7
100
Joint Auditors
Number %
Panel C: Auditor opinions and joint auditors
Unqualified Opinion
99 59.6
Modified Opinion
67 40.4
N
166 100

251

79.4

528

74.6

65

20.6

180

25.4

316

100

708

100

Single Auditor
Number %
735 76.2
229 23.8
964 100

Notes: χ2 test for the difference between auditor opinion and auditor type for
government-owned companies: χ2 = 0.013, p = 0.613;
χ2 test for the difference between auditor opinion and auditor type for
non-government-owned companies: χ2 = 2.828, p = 0.054;
χ2 test for the difference between auditor opinion and MS (joint auditors or single
auditor): χ2 = 20.200, p = 0.000.
** Represents statistical significance at the 1% level.
* Represents statistical significance at the 5% level.
All variables are as defined in Table 1.
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Table 5 presents the probit regression results for auditor choice from Model (1)
based on the full sample of 1,142 firm-year observations during the 2006-2008
period. The model is significant at the 5% level, indicating a significant relationship
between the dependent and the independent variables. All of the significant
coefficient signs in the model are in the expected direction. The ownership variable
has a positive coefficient (at the 1% significance level), showing that Indian
government-owned companies are more likely to choose local Indian auditors. The
coefficient of MS is negative (at the 1% significance level), indicating that the
appointment of joint auditors normally involves all local auditors. In addition, the
coefficients for Assets and Auditors_fees are significantly negative at the 1% and 5%
significance levels, respectively, suggesting that companies that have a larger asset
base and have paid more audit fees are more likely to choose Big 4 auditors.
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Table 5: Heckman first-step probit regression of self-selection of auditor(s)
(Dependent variable: Locality)
Predicted Sign
Coeft.
Z-Statistic
P-Value
-4.316
-11.130
0.000
Constant
1.486
6.330
0.000**
+
Ownership
-0.405
-2.720
0.006**
MS
1.295
13.810
0.000**
Assets
0.399
1.000
0.319
Inventories
+
-0.220
-0.580
0.564
Receivables
+
0.044
1.380
0.169
Current_ratio
-0.047
-1.890
0.059
D/E_ratio
+
0.025
1.400
0.162
ROE
Auditors_fees
-0.035
-1.970
0.049*
Age
-0.002
-0.310
0.760
Lambda
0.377
3.520
0.000
Sample Size
1142
Notes: ** Represents statistical significance at the 1% level.
* Represents statistical significance at the 5% level.
All variables are as defined in Table 1.
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In the second step of the regression based on Model (2), I test my hypotheses
and identify the determinants of auditor opinion issuance. I include Ownership, Type,
Own*Type, MS, MS*Big4, the six financial control variables, F_dummy,
Year_dummy_1-2, and Indu_dummy_1-5 in the regression. The inverse Mills ratios
are also incorporated to control for the self-selection problem between auditees and
auditors. The positive coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio suggests that Indian
government-owned companies more often select local auditors than randomly
selected companies would select.
Table 6 shows the findings of the second-step opinion issuance logit model with
and without the inverse Mills ratios. When the logit regression is run without the
inverse Mills ratios, the direction of the coefficient on Ownership is consistent with
the prediction, but not significance. However, after adding the inverse Mills ratios to
the binary logit regression model to control for self-selection bias, the coefficient
becomes significant. Moreover, pseudo R-squared for the overall model increases by
nearly 1.7%.
In addition, instead of excluding the 148 observations of financial companies
from the full sample which will significantly reduce sample size, I create a dummy
variable (F_dummy) that is equal to 1 for financial company observations and is
equal to 0 for non-financial company observations. This dummy is employed to
identify whether financial companies and non-financial companies differ
significantly in auditor reporting quality. The empirical regression result reported in
Table 6 indicates no difference in the possibility of receiving a modified auditor
opinion between financial companies and non-financial companies.
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Table 6: Heckman second-step logit regression of opinion issuance
(Dependent variable: Opinion)
Adjusted by Imills
Original
Predicted
Sign
Coeft. Wald χ2 P-value Coeft. Wald χ2 P-value
Constant
-2.461
9.719
0.002
-7.622
1.000
0.000
Ownership
+
0.892
1.415
0.234
2.101
6.332
0.012*
Type
-0.822
14.672
0.000*
-0.688
9.553
0.002*
Own*Type
?
-0.004
0.000
0.996
-0.708
0.711
0.399
MS
-0.952
14.780
0.000*
-0.892
11.862
0.001*
MS*Big4
?
1.172
6.055
0.014*
0.691
1.902
0.168
Assets
0.258
5.308
0.021*
1.345
20.409
0.000*
Inventories
+
-0.457
0.528
0.467
0.376
0.310
0.578
Receivables
+
0.716
1.711
0.191
0.680
1.540
0.215
Current_ratio
0.001
0.014
0.907
0.108
5.608
0.018*
D/E_ratio
+
-0.019
0.223
0.637
-0.047
1.317
0.251
ROE
-0.003
0.017
0.897
0.012
0.316
0.574
F_dummy
0.459
0.651
0.420
0.391
0.430
0.512
Yeardummy_1
0.055
0.098
0.754
0.056
0.096
0.757
Yeardummy_2
-0.043
0.060
0.807
-0.008
0.002
0.965
INDU_dummy_1
0.412
0.571
0.450
0.537
0.891
0.345
INDU_dummy_3
0.451
0.416
0.519
0.293
0.157
0.692
INDU_dummy_4
0.333
0.355
0.551
0.479
0.676
0.411
INDU_dummy_5
0.459
0.547
0.459
0.575
0.804
0.370
Imills
+
1.327
1.000
0.000
2
Pseudo R
0.041
0.058
Sample Size
1142
1142
LR chi2(18) = 53.52
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Notes: * Represents statistical significance at the 5% level.
All variables are as defined in Table 1.
Indu_dummy_2 is dropped because of collinearity.
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LR chi2(18) = 75.03
Prob > chi2 = 0.000

The adjusted binary logit regression results for the auditor opinion issuance
determinants are reported on the right-hand side of Table 6. The empirical results are
consistent with my three hypotheses. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the Type variable
relates negatively to Opinion at the 1% significance level, providing good support for
the prediction that Big 4 firms provide audits of higher quality than those of their
local counterparts in India. The coefficient for Ownership is also significant at 5%
level and supports the prediction in Hypothesis 2 that Indian government-owned
companies are more likely to receive modified opinions than non-government-owned
companies. This finding supports the view that the Indian government assumes a
supervisory rather than a collusive role when interacting with the auditors of Indian
government-owned companies. The coefficient for MS is significant at 1% level and
is negative, thereby confirming the expectation of Hypothesis 3 that audits conducted
by joint auditors are of higher quality than those conducted by a single auditor.
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Chapter 6 Conclusions
This research extends previous accounting research on auditor independence
and audit quality in the setting of India, a country about which relatively few prior
studies have been conducted. I investigate the correlation between auditor type, firm
ownership, and the issuance of auditor opinions under the joint audit requirement. I
report exploratory empirical results based on a sample of 1,142 firm-year
observations from the 2006-2008 period for firms listed on the Bombay Stock
Exchange (BSE) that are members of the A-group of 200 companies and B-group
firms audited by Big 4 affiliates in India.
First, my findings support the prediction that companies audited by Big 4
auditors (international auditors) are more likely to receive a modified opinion than
companies audited by local Indian auditors. In contrast to an earlier study on India
that uses aduit fee as the measure of audit quality (Simon et al., 1986), I use the
frequency of receiving a modified audit opinion as the measure of audit quality
which avoids low balling and other complexities affecting audit fees. Second,
government-owned companies are associated with greater likelihood of receiving
qualified opinions than non-government-owned companies in India, indicating the
special supervisory role of the Indian government. Finally, the joint audit
requirement is associated with a higher audit quality, which complements prior
research findings on joint audit requirement in France but in a single country setting.
This exploratory empirical study has a number of limitations that should be
taken into account in interpreting the results. First, because data on audit fees among
joint auditors is unavailable at the firm level, I cannot have a more precise measure
of the auditor fees variable (the amount allocated to each auditor) in the regression
models used in this study. Second, because the research period is limited to
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2006-2008, further research based on data from other periods may further confirm
the results obtained. Third, although the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) is the
biggest and most important stock exchange in India and its A-group and B-group
firms are the best listed companies on the BSE, the sample selection method
employed means this study is skewed towards larger Indian firms. I have not studied
companies listed on India’s two other stock exchanges, the CSE (the Calcutta Stock
Exchange) and the NSE (the National Stock Exchange). However, it is unrealistic to
expect a single study to address all the gaps that exist in the prior literature.
Furthermore, given that this is an exploratory empirical study, it is reasonable to start
with a sample of higher quality listed companies.
This paper has implications for policy makers and users of financial information
on listed firms regarding the quality of auditor reporting in India. First, the Big 4
auditors are confirmed to be associated with higher auditor reporting quality in the
Indian setting. Hence, investors and information users should have a good degree of
confidence in Big 4 auditor opinions issued on Indian companies. Second, Indian
government-owned companies are more likely to receive qualified auditor opinions.
This result indicates the constructive role played by regulators such as the CAG in
ensuring sufficient supervisory oversight and is a lesson that can be transferred to
other transitional economies that suffer from collusion between government and
auditors in the audits of government-owned companies. Finally, the results of this
study show that the joint audit requirement enhances auditor reporting quality, which
should provide an encouragement for other countries to consider the use of joint
auditors.
Further research may examine how the professional reputation of Big 4 auditors
and their brand recognition in the Indian audit service market have been affected by
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the Satyam scandal that occurred in January 2009. The Satyam Scandal is sometimes
called India's Enron, which was publicly announced on 7 January 2009, when
Chairman of the company, Ramalinga Raju, confessed that Satyam's accounts had
been falsified for up to $1 billion. As the auditor of Satyam in 2009 was
PricewaterhouseCoopers, this scandal has shaken investor confidence in one of the
world’s Big Four accounting firms, which have expanded rapidly in Asia despite a
general shortage of qualified accountants. This study can also be considered as an
exploratory investigation that ushers the way for researchers and regulators to study
and compare factors that contribute to audit quality in transitional economies.
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Appendix 1: Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) group classifications
Group A: Shares in this category have high levels of liquidity, market capitalization and
capital appreciation.
Groups B1 and B2: Similar to A and with good liquidity, but slightly lower levels of market
capitalization and capital appreciation. These are financially healthy stocks.
Group T: Transactions in these shares must be settled by way of delivery only. Transactions
in shares trading with a "T" designation require the actual delivery of scripts.
Group S: The Exchange has introduced a new segment named “BSE Indonext” with effect
from January 7, 2005. The “S” group represents scripts forming part of the “BSE Indonext”
segment. The “S” group consists of scripts from the “B1” & “B2” groups on the BSE and
companies exclusively listed on regional stock exchanges that have capital of 30 million
rupees to 300 million rupees. All tradings in this segment are done through the BOLT system
under the S group.
Group TS: The “TS” group consists of scripts in the “BSE-Indonext” segments which are
settled on a trade-to-trade basis as a surveillance measure.
Group Z: Suspended lots of shares. Shares in this group are suspended due to
non-compliance with exchange board rules.
Apart from these equity groups, there are two other groups: fixed income securities (group F,
a debt market segment) and government securities (group G). For more details, see the
source: http://www.bseindia.com/about/tradnset.asp.
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Appendix 2: Names of BIG 4 affiliates in India
Big 4
Deloitte
Ernst & Young
KPMG
Price Waterhouse

Affiliates in India
Deloitte Haskins & Sells, C. C. Chokshi & Co., A. F. Ferguson &
Co, A. F. Ferguson & Associates, S.B. Billimoria & Co., and P. C.
Hansotia
S.R. Batliboi & Company, S. R Batliboi & Associates, and
S.V. Ghatalia & Associates
BSR, BSR & Associates, and BSR & Company
Price Waterhouse, Price Waterhouse & Co, Lovelock & Lewes ,
RSM & Co., and Dalal & Shah

Notes:
1. Some of the Big 4 affiliates in India cannot use their global brand names due to
regulations issued by the ICAI in 1988 specifying that “The name of any firm that wants to
register for ICAI membership must have a combination of the names of the partners or a
name in being, that is a name in use before this rule was introduced.”
2. Indian affiliates of the Big 4 international network firms operate using their pre-1988
registered brand names (eg. DTT and PRICE WATERHOUSE). The other two Big 4 firms
(ERNST & YOUNG and KPMG) did not have any firms registered with the ICAI before
1988 and hence must use completely unconnected Indian member firm brand names. In
addition, all four firms have private limited companies registered in India that use the global
brand and actively sell all the firm’s services other than those that must be provided by ICAI
members. These private limited companies are not required to follow the strict code of ethics
and are not subject to other ICAI rules and regulations.
3. The above information was provided by the CMIE (Centre for Monitoring Indian
Economy).
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